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Krifka [1993] has suggested that focus
should be seen as a means of providing ma-
terial for a range of semantic and pragmatic
functions to work on, rather than as a spe-
cific semantic or pragmatic function itself.
The current paper describes an implemen-
tation of this general idea, and applies it to
the interpretation of only and not.
1 Background
Consider the following sentences:
(1) I only borrowed your car
(2) I only borrowed your car
(3) I only borrowed your car
All of them entail the same basic message, namely that
I borrowed your car. In addition to the basic mes-
sage, however, they also carry information about what
I didn’t do. (1) says that I didn’t borrow any of your
other possessions, (2) says that I didn’t borrow anyone
else’s car, and (3) says that I didn’t do anything else to
your car. It seems as though the word only and the fo-
cus marker (indicated here by underlining the stressed
word) combine to add an extra message about what I
didn’t do.
A similar phenomenon appears to be taking place
in the next set of sentences:
(4) I didn’t steal your car
(5) I didn’t steal your car
(6) I didn’t steal your car
Each of these says that I didn’t steal your car, but
again they each carry some extra message. (4) says
that I did steal something which belongs to you, (5)
says that I stole somebody’s car, but not yours, and (6)
says that I did do something to your car (I probably
borrowed it, though that is not entailed by (6)).
Krifka [1993] argues that in (1–3) and (4–6), and in
a number of other situations as well, the focus marker1
1The term focus has been used in a wide variety of
ways. In the present paper I simply use it to denote the
part(s) of an utterance to which attention is drawn by stress
markers.
is used to extract part of the interpretation. Operators
like only and so-called “focussed negation” then com-
bine the extracted element of the interpretation with
what was left behind to carry complex messages of the
kind discussed above.
The current paper shows how to implement this
general notion, without following Krifka’s analysis in
detail. The crucial point is the provision of some way
of storing the extracted part of the interpretation and
making it available when required. The interpretation
of only and focussed negation is fairly straightforward,
so long as the treatment of the focussed item itself is
coherent.
2 Abstraction and Focus
The general aim of this paper is to show how to use
focus to decompose the interpretation of a phrase into
two parts, where one part is the interpretation of the
focussed item and the other is some object with which
this can combine. Suppose, for example, we thought
that the VP ate a peach should be interpreted as:
λA∃Y (event(Y ) ∧ type(Y, eat)
∧past(Y ) ∧ agent(Y,A)
∧∃X(peach(X) ∧ object(Y,X)))
In other words, this VP is an abstraction over events
where somebody ate a peach. Then we would want the
two objects corresponding to the interpretation of ate
a peach to be something like:
λZpeach(Z)
and
λPλA∃Y (event(Y ) ∧ type(Y, eat)
∧past(Y ) ∧ agent(Y,A)
∧∃XP.X ∧ object(Y,X)))
Here we have extracted the denotation of peach as the
property of being a peach, and converted the interpre-
tation of the VP to an abstraction which will combine
appropriately with this property to reproduce the orig-
inal interpretation 2.
Where else do we see a phenomenon of this kind?
Consider the following phrases:
2You cannot freely mix λ-calculus and the truth func-
tional connectives of predicate calculus as we have here
without running into the paradoxes of self-reference — Rus-
1
(7) the man who stole your bike
(8) the man who I wanted you to meet
In (7) the property of being a man combines with the
property of being someone who stole your bike to con-
struct a contextually minimal unique characterisation
of the relevant individual, and similarly in (8). To
achieve this, we need to interpret the relative pronouns
in the two relative clauses as leaving a hole in the inter-
pretation of clause and then abstracting with respect
to that hole. This is clear for (8), but it also holds for
(7) if we want to interpret a sentence like a man stole
a bike as
∃Y (event(Y ) ∧ type(Y, steal) ∧ past(Y )
∧∃Z(man(Z) ∧ agent(Y, Z))
∧∃X(bike(X) ∧ object(Y,X)))
where the quantifier introduced by the subject does not
in fact have maximal scope (an analysis I have argued
for elsewhere [Ramsay 1992a]).
The treatment of (8) clearly requires much the
same mechanism as we will require if we want to deal
with focus as outlined above, and this may or may not
also hold for (7). Any serious NLP system will include
some way of dealing with the interpretation of cases
like (8), and almost any such mechanism should be
open to adaptation to deal with focus along the sug-
gested lines. One such approach is outlined below.
3 Quantification, Pre-
supposition, Abstraction and
Focus
We expect to interpret relative clauses (uncontrover-
sially) and phrases with focussed constituents (more
controversially) as abstractions over the interpreta-
tions of simple sentences. In order to construct inter-
pretations of the kinds of objects we are interested in,
then, we have to start by looking at simple sentences.
The analyses presented in this paper start from the fol-
lowing observations, most of which are fairly orthodox:
• Indefinite NPs should be viewed as a way of in-
troducing items (or preferably sets of items) into
the discourse. Universally quantified NPs say
that all items of the specified type satisfy some
property.
• VPs should be viewed as a way of introducing
events or possibly sets of events into the dis-
course.
sell’s paradox, the Liar, and so on. The notation used in
this paper looks, for the sake of familiarity, like a combi-
nation of λ-calculus and predicate calculus, but is in fact
grounded in the revision-based semantics of Turner’s [1987]
property theory.
• If you construct interpretations by paraphrasing
NL sentences into a formal language which ex-
tends predicate calculus, you have to realise that
the scope of quantifiers in your paraphrases may
not be determined by simple structural proper-
ties of the source text.
• Definite NPs and other presuppositional con-
structions place constraints on the discourse, so
that a sentence containing the phrase the man
will be uninterpretable in contexts not contain-
ing a unique man (a version of this point has been
made by, among others, Barwise & Perry [1983],
Kamp [1984], Groenendijk & Stokhof [1987]).
• There are interactions of scope between definite
NPs and other types of expression: in Each man
kills the thing he loves, the presuppositional con-
struct the thing he loves requires the existence of
a single target of affection per man.
The standard way to deal with the potential dis-
crepancy between where a phrase appears and the
width of its scope is by storing quantifiers on a quanti-
fier stack until the entire sentence has been interpreted,
and then using explicit information about the prior-
ity of various quantifiers to sort things out [Cooper
1983, Vestre 1991]. The work reported here follows this
treatment, but extends it by introducing quantifier-like
entities for dealing with presuppositional items such as
definite NPs (see Ramsay [1992b, 1994] for a formal ac-
count of such constraints on whether a sentence is
meaningful with respect to a situation). As an exam-
ple, the sentence the woman stole a bike is interpreted
as
∃A A < now
∧ ιB : (∀C member(C,B)→ woman(C)
∧ |B| = 1)
∃D ∀E member(E,D)→ bike(E)
∧ |D| = 1
∧ simple(A, λF event(F )
∧ type(F, steal)
∧ agent(F,B)
∧ object(F,D))
This says that the relationship simple holds between
some past instant A and the property of being a cer-
tain sort of event. What sort of event? One where
a bike is stolen by someone (or rather, where a sin-
gleton set of bikes is stolen). Writing something like
ιB : (∀C member(C,B)→ woman(C)∧ |B| = 1)W ,
where W may contain occurrences of B, says that W
holds for the contextually unique individual B which
satisfies the restriction that B is a woman (is a single-
ton set of women). If this restriction fails to pick out a
unique individual the whole expression is meaningless
in the context.
Most of this analysis is fairly orthodox. The two
main points that might require some defence are the
analysis of aspect in terms of a relationship between
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temporal objects and event types, which is discussed in
[Ramsay 1993], and the treatment of definite reference
in terms of constraints on meaningfulness. Neither of
these is crucial to the remainder of the paper, but if
you don’t like them you will have to replace them with
something better, and you are unlikely to find some-
thing which is both better and simpler.
The analysis above was obtained in a framework
where quantifier scope is determined on the basis of in-
formation explicitly associated with a form of Cooper
storage ([Cooper 1983]), using abstraction operators
of the form λW∃XW , λW∀XW or λWιX : RW which
can be applied to a formula to bind its free variables.
Within this framework, it is perfectly easy to deal with
cases like (8) by allowing the relative pronoun to add
the expression λWλXW to the quantifier store, an-
notated to specify that this expression has maximal
scope. If this expression is applied to a formula con-
taining a free occurrence of X it will return an abstrac-
tion with respect to X — exactly what we want. The
requirement that this should have maximal scope will
ensure that X is the last free variable in W .
But if we can use this mechanism to construct an
abstraction as the interpretation of a relative clause,
we can also use it to construct an abstraction as the
interpretation of a phrase containing a focussed item.
The only extra work we have to perform is that we
have to find somewhere to put the interpretation of
the focussed item itself. To do this, all that is needed
is an extra feature focus in the descriptions of lin-
guistic items. The value of focus is the focussed item
itself. focus behaves like a GPSG foot feature, in
that at most one daughter of an item can have a non-
vacuous value for focus, and that if an item does have
exactly one daughter with a non-vacuous value for this
feature then the item will share this value with that
daughter. focus is thus very like the standard feature
slash which is used for dealing with left extraposition
— it is a foot feature whose value is some item which
is somehow “out of position”.
4 Applications of Focus
Once we have this mechanism, we can use it to con-
struct interpretations of sentences like (1)–(6). Con-
sider, for instance, the example:
(9) I only borrowed a car
only(λAcar(A),
λB ∃C C < now
∧ ∃D ∀E member(E,D)→ B.E
∧ |D| = 1
∧ ιF : (∀Gmember(G,F )
→ speaker(G)
∧ |F | = 1)
simple(C,K)))
where K is λHevent(H) ∧ type(H, borrow) ∧
agent(H,F ) ∧ object(H,D) (this has been extracted
from the displayed formula to get it inside the available
space — it is in fact part of that formula).
This says that the relationship only holds between the
property of being a car and some other object. This
is fine as far as it goes, but it isn’t worth very much
unless we spell out the conditions under which this
relationship holds. The following meaning postulate
does just that:
∀P∀Q(only(P,Q)→ Q.P ∧ (∀P ′(Q.P ′ → P ′ = P )))
In other words, if only(P,Q) holds then P satisfies Q
and nothing else does. In the present case, the first of
these consequences means that I did indeed borrow a
car:
∃C C < now
∧ ∃D ∀E member(E,D)→ car(E) ∧ |D| = 1
∧ ιF : (∀G member(G,F )→ speaker(G)
∧ |F | = 1)
simple(C,K)))
where K = λHevent(H) ∧ type(H, borrow) ∧
agent(H,F )∧object(H,D))) has again been extracted
to save space. This was obtained from the meaning
postulate by substituting λAcar(A)) for B and using
(λAcar(A)).E ≡ car(E).
The second consequence of the MP for only says that
there is no other category of item which satisfies the
abstraction — that the only thing I borrowed was a
car.
If we put the focus somewhere else, we get another
interpretation:
(10) I only borrowed a car
only(λA λB λC event(C) ∧ type(C, borrow)
∧ B.λD(agent(C,D))
∧ A.λE(object(C,E)),
λF ∃G G < now
∧ ∃H ∀I member(I,H)→ car(I)
∧ |H | = 1
∧ ιJ : (∀Kmember(K, J)
→ speaker(K)
∧ |J | = 1)
simple(G,K))
where K = (F.λL(L.H)).λM(M.J)))
This says that only holds between a description
of the type of event C where somebody B bor-
rows something A, and an abstraction over situa-
tions in which I did something to some car. Then
the first consequence of only says that what I did
to this car was I borrowed it: substituting the
description of the event type for the abstracted
variable F produces ((λAλBλCevent(C) ∧ type(C,
borrow) ∧ B.λD(agent(C, D)) ∧ A.λE(object(C,
E))).λL(L.H)).λM(M.J) as the second argument of
simple, and this reduces to λCevent(C) ∧ type(C,
borrow) ∧ agent(C, J)) ∧ object(C, H), which is what
we want. The second says that I didn’t do anything
else to it.
Much the same will happen with
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(11) I didn’t steal it
not(λA λB λC event(C) ∧ type(C, steal)
∧ B.λD(agent(C,D))
∧ A.λE(object(C,E)),
λF ∃G G < now
∧ ιH : (∀I member(I,H)→ neuter(I)
∧ |H | = 1)
ιJ : (∀K member(K, J)
→ speaker(K)
∧ |J | = 1)
simple(G,K))
where K = F.λL(L.H).λM(M.J)))
Here we have a 2-place relation not, which is
backed up by the following MP:
∀P∀Q(not(P,Q)→ (¬Q.P ∧ ∃P ′(Q.P ′)))
This says that this form of negation holds between P
and Q if Q does not hold of P , but does hold for some
other entity P ′. In the present case, this means that I
did do something to it (whatever “it” is), but what I
did was not stealing.
This contrasts with simple negation, with no fo-
cussed item, as in:
(12) I didn’t steal it
¬(∃A A < now
∧ ιB : (∀C member(C,B)→ neuter(C)
∧ |B| = 1)
ιD : (∀E member(E,D)
→ speaker(E)
∧ |D| = 1)
simple(A,K)))
whereK = λFevent(F )∧type(F, steal)∧agent(F,D)∧
object(F,B)))
This simply says that it is not the case that there
is a past stealing event involving me and it. The choice
between the two is forced by the presence or absence
of a focussed item.
As a final example, consider a sentence which con-
tains a focussed item but no operator for using it up:
(13) A man ate it
The analysis of this is an abstraction over kinds of
individuals who ate it
λA ∃B B < now
∧ ∃C ∀D member(D,C)→ A.D
∧ |C| = 1
∧ ιE : (∀F member(F,E)
→ neuter(F )
∧ |E| = 1)
simple(B,K)
with K = λGevent(G) ∧ type(G, eat) ∧ agent(G,C) ∧
object(G,E)), and with the focus set as the descrip-
tion (including the semantic analysis) of the focussed
phrase man. This is just the kind of object required
for a discourse operator such as contrast or elaboration
— exactly which such operator is appropriate depends
on factors not visible in (13) itself, but whatever it is
it will require a pair of arguments of this kind.
5 Conclusions
The discussion above shows what can be achieved by
treating focus as a syntactic marker which makes infor-
mation available to a variety of operators. The mecha-
nism for doing this involves introducing a foot feature
to carry the focussed item around, and constructing
appropriate abstractions by using the standard quan-
tifier scoping mechanism which is required for other
phenomena anyway. Different NLP systems will deal
with the syntax and semantics of phenomena such as
left- and right-extraposition in different ways. What
I have argued is that almost any approach to these
phenomena can be adapted to deal with focus as well.
The examples in Section 4 showed how you can com-
bine these analyses of focus with a variety of operators
to convey a range of interpretations of the same se-
quence of words. It is important to recall at this point
that the interpretation language being used here is a
highly intensional logic which permits quantification
over arbitrary kinds of individual, including quantifi-
cation over properties and propositions. I have argued
elsewhere that such a language is required for a wide
variety of phenomena. The interpretation of focus is
just another example.
6 Implementation
All the analyses in this paper were produced, and λ-
reduced (and turned into LATEX!), by a version of the
system described in [Ramsay 1992a]. This consists
of a highly lexical grammar with a compositional se-
mantics, parsed via a bi-directional head-driven chart
parser. I believe it is virtually impossible to do this
kind of work without embodying it in a working sys-
tem. You simply cannot explore the consequences
of doing something one way rather than another, or
of combining an analysis of this with an analysis of
that, unless activities such as compositional construc-
tion and subsequent λ-reduction of interpretations is
done for you by machine.
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